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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN 
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND 
TOWN. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
18191 
STATEMENT OF TEE NATURE OF THE CASE 
At the trial in the District Court, Highland Town, 
now known as Highland City, because of the nature of the 
proceeding, was referred to as Respondent, rather than De-
fendant. Inasmuch as Highland City is the party appealing 
the case to this Court, however, all future references to 
it in this Brief will be to Appellant. This will prevent 
confusion with the Petitioners below who hereafter will be 
designated as Respondents. 
This was a proceeding in which Respondents, herein, 
sought to disconnect approximately 131 acres of territory 
from the limits of what was then known as Highland Town, 
but which has since become a third class city. Highland 
City, acting through its Mayor and City Council opposed 
the petition of Respondents and the case proceeded to trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on February 11 and February 29, 
1 
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1980, before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting without a 
jury. Evidence was presented by both sides. At the conclusion 
of the evidentiary phase of the trial it was determined that 
memoranda would be prepared and oral arguments made after the 
transcript of the evidence became available. Accordingly, 
the memoranda were filed and the case argued to the Court on 
August 22, 1980. The Court then prepared a Decision which 
was signed August 28, 1980. The Court thereupon appointed 
a Commission to conduct a public hearing pursuant to statute, 
which was done on July 7, 1981. The report of the Commission-
ers was filed with the Court and approved on October 23, 19810 
The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and an Order of Disconnection of Respondents' 131 acres of 
land from Highland City on November 4, 1981. Appellant filed 
a timely Motion for a New Trial,. or in the alternative, to 
amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Disconnection. The court entered its order denying the motion 
on December 10, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order remanding the case to the 
District Court with instructions to consider all of the evidence 
presented by Appellant and Intervenors, both during the trial 
and in connection with its motion for a new trial, in deter-
mining whether or not to allow disconnection of the territory. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant will treat certain areas in greater detail 
in the arguments that follow, but the essential facts of the 
case are these: 
Highland Town was incorporated in the summer of 1977. 
It later became a third class city, known as Highland City. 
While it varies in length and width, its dimensions can be 
stated generally to be about three miles long from east to 
west and from two to three miles wide from north to south. 
It is located in the northernmost portion of Utah County, 
between Alpine on the north and American Fork on the South. 
The 131 acres in question are situated in the east and 
northeast portions of the city. 
While the Respondents include several different 
individuals and business entities, most of the territory 
in question is under the effective control or ownership of 
Gibbons Realty Company. It is anticipated by both Appellant 
and Respondents that some portion of the area in question 
will be used by Gibbons and Reed Co. for a gravel and sand 
extraction process, even though no such activity has been 
conducted there in the past. 
Appellant believes, and its witnesses testified; 
that the operation of such a process would seriously disrupt 
the quality of life now enjoyed, not only by the residents 
of Highland City, but by the residents of Alpine City, as 
3 
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well. 
The disr~ption would result from increased noise, 
and vibration; dirt and dust in the air and on the highways; 
and danger from increased vehicle traffic. 
In addition, Appellant presented evidence that a 
large majority of Highland's residents opposed any industrial 
development of this type within the city limits, preferring 
that the city remain essentially a rural, residential commun-
ity. 
The city of Highland is zoned residential and agri-
cultural only, with no commercial or industrial areas. 
The territory in question has two state highways and 
some erstwhile private roads, which are located in property 
under lease from Utah Power and Light Co., with an option in 
the city to purchase it. 
Law enforcement is provided by Highland City through 
a contract with the Utah County Sheriff's Department, and fire 
protection is provided by Highland City through a contract with 
Alpine City. 
There are no publicly owned or operated water or 
sewer services in the area, although the City hopes to locate 
a water pressure tank there and to run water lines from it into 
other portions of the city. 
The City hopes sometime to build a cemetary or park, 
or both in the area. 
4 
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Appellant believes that the annexation of what is 
known as the "Kjar property" after the evidence was in, but 
before the Order of Disconnection was signed by the court, 
constitutes an island or an unusually large or varied-shaped 
land mass projecting into the boundaries of Highland City. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND 
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN ARRIVING AT ITS 
DECISION, AND IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF 
DISCONNECTION, ALL THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED 
AT TRIAL BY APPELLANT'S AND INTERVENORS' 
WITNESSES. 
Two statutes dealing with the conduct of trials 
relating to disc.onnection of territory from the boundaries 
of cities and towns are controlling on the trial Court. 
They are Sections 10-2-501 (3) and 10-2-503 Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953) as amended. The pertinent language of these 
sections follows: 
10-2-501 (3): ...• the question of disconnection 
shall be tried before the district court in 
the same manner as civil cases are tried. The 
officers of the municipality, or any person 
interested in the subject matter of the 
petition may appear before the court and contest 
the granting of the petition for disconnection 
by presenting the evidence as they deem relevant. 
(Emphasis added). 
10-2-503: The Court for the purposes of deter-
mining whether or not territory should be dis-
connected shall consider whether or not dis-
connection will leave the municipality with a 
residual area within its boundaries for which 
the costs, requirements, 
5 
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or other burdens of municipal services 
would materially increase over previous 
years or for which it would become eco-
nomically or practically unreasonable to 
administer as a municipality. The court 
shall consider among other factors the 
effect of the disconnection on existing 
or projected street, or public ways, water 
mains and water services, sewer mains and 
sewer services, law enforcement, zoning 
and other municipal services and whether 
or not the disconnection will result in 
islands or unusually large or varied-shaped 
peninsular masses within or projecting 
into the boundaries of the municipality 
from which the territory is to be dis-
connected. (Emphasis added). 
Pursuant to the authority granted by these statutes, 
Appellant proceeded to produce evidence on a variety of irn-
portant questions. 
Mayor Donald R. LeBaron testified that disconnection 
of the territory would hamper Appellant in carrying out its 
responsibility for the peace, health, and safety of its resi-
dents (T.76). He gave his opinion as to the effect disconnect-
ion would have on water and air quality planning by Highland 
City. He testified as to the investments made by Highland's 
homeowners to preserve their homes from "degradation and 
anything else that might happen. 11 (T. 77, 78) . 
Mayor LeBaron said the city was looking at the 
possibility of developing the Utah Power and Light Company 
property, which is part of the territory soughtto be dis-
connected, into a recreational area and city cemetary (T.182), 
and that it would be much easier to control the area if it 
6 
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were to remain part of the city (T.183). He said that if 
the territory were not disconnected, the city would run a 
sewer line into it (T.184). Mayor LeBaron said the city 
was considering locating a water tower on the Utah Power and 
Light Company property under lease and option to the city, 
and that it would probably attempt to locate a pipe to carry 
water from the tower within about three years (T.228). He 
testified as to the necessity of a holding pond on the terri-
tory in question (T.229). Were it not for the disconnection, 
all of the line would be inside the city limits (T.230). 
City police protection would be provided to prevent vandalism 
around the line (T.231). 
Dr. F. LaMond Tullis, a former city councilman, 
testified that a Mr. Bagley of Gibbons and Reed Company had 
told the town council that the company desired, at that time, 
to construct and operate a gravel extraction plant, but that 
later it might also decide to include a cement batch plant 
and an asphalt batch plant. The town counciltheceupon dis-
cussed the matter. The council expressed a "similar theme 11 
that the consensus was to have a low density residential 
community (T.130), and each member of the council then spoke 
of his opposition to the industrialization of Highland. (T.131). 
Dr. Tullis told how public opinion surveys and small 
neighborhood meetings were utilized to determine what kind of 
a town the residents wanted. Eighty percent of the households 
7 
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were canvassed (T.133, 134). Ultimately, a final document was 
prepared. (T.135). 
Dr. Tullis testified that people had moved to Highland 
because they were fleeing something they didn 1 t 1 ike in other 
places, and they were attracted to Highland because of a cer-
tain quality of life and environment they found there. They 
wanted spacious living and a high quality of air and water. 
(T.139). 
Specifically, according to Dr. Tullis' testimony, 
they rejected the commercial and indus~rial development of 
Highland. (T.140). A master plan was adopted,. (T.145), 
followed by a zoning ordinance establishing residential and 
agricultural, but no commercial or industrial classifications 
(T. 146). He testified that the surveys taken indicated 
people in Highland didn't want any gravel extraction beyond 
what already existed with the Ashrock operation extracting 
about 200,000 tons a year (T.149). 
J. Keith Hayes, representing the Hayes family, 
which sold some of the territory in question to Gibbons 
Realty Company, testified that no gravel had ever been ex-
tracted (T.261), that he and his family had made an effort 
to get out of the lawsuit (T.252), and that they had made an 
"overture" toward being released from the peitition (T.257). 
A proffer of testimony of Sidney Baucom, Vice Presi-
dent of Utah Power and Light co., was to the effect that the 
8 
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company had no particular policy relating to disconnection 
matters, that he signed the papers as an accommodation to 
Respondents' counsel, and that he did not know until shortly 
prior to signing the papers whether the power company's 
property was in the city, or in the county. (T.224). 
Virginia Mathis, a housewife and mother, testified 
that there was already a steady stream of dump trucks going 
past her house from the Ashrock operation, that the trucks 
were extremely noisy, that they caused vibrations in.her house 
to the point where objects fell off shelves, that dust was 
a problem along with the noise, that the present operation 
was disturbing to the extent of preventing conversation on 
her front~orch, that the safety factor was such as to pre-
vent her children from playing with those across the street, 
that the trucks had made it impossible the previous year to 
sell her house, and that any additional gravel extraction 
operation would "certainly affect our quality of life." 
(T .120-125) . 
Gordon Buckley Rose, the Utah County Planner, testi-
fied that if the territory in questionwere "deannexed, we 
would have a great difficulty in providing services. We 
have intended for Highland town to provide these services." 
(T.196). 
Lee R. Fox, a deputy sheriff, testified about the 
peculiar types of criminal activity that he had observed in 
9 
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the area in question, including beer parties and nude 
swimming (T. 203-206). 
Robert Palmquist, Mayor of North Salt Lake, 
testified about a large gravel pit located in that city (T. 263). 
Respondents' attorney objected to the evidence. A proffer 
was given by Appellant's attorney to the effect that, from 
Mayor Palmquist's own experiences, a gravel operation has an 
impact on an immediately adjacent town and that it is much 
better to retain gravel operations within the town than to have 
them outside and not subject to the town's control. The Court 
sustained an objection to this evidence (T. 265). 
In addition, the Respondents' own witness, Emery 
Carter, Executive Vice President of Gibbons and Reed Company, 
testified on cross examination by Appellant's attorney that 
in a busy year the company might extract as much as one hundred 
sixty thousand tons of sand and gravel, and that 11 you would 
probably have about on·e truck every twelve minutes if you are 
working about 40 weeks a year, eight hours a day, five days a 
week. 11 (T. 249). 
Alpine City, Pleasant Grove City, and Lindon City 
intervened in the case and Don Christiansen, Mayor of Alpine 
City, testified that a gravel extraction operation on the 
property sought to be disconnected would have an adverse 
effect on the area near the mouth of American Fork Canyon 
(T. 157), that he was concerned about dust that might come 
10 
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from the operc1.tion into Alpine City (T. 159) , that it would 
create a traffic hazard on Highway 92 (T. 162), and that 
there would be an advantage for the property in question 
remaining under Highland City's control. (T. 167). 
But the foregoing evidence was almost wholly dis-
regarded by the Court. Indeed, in his "Decision" dated August 
28, 1980, (R. 125), the trial judge (page 4) wrote: 
Much of the evidence presented by the re-
spondents, other than that pertaining to 
municipal services, the Court considers to 
be irrelevant to a determination as to 
whether disconnection should be allowed 
in this case. The Court is mindful of 
the strong feelings that the inhabitants 
of Highland have about the possibility 
of additional sand and gravel operations 
along the east bench area of the community. 
The Court construed the statute relative 
to the evidence it must hear as being that 
which any interested party would 11 deem11 
relevant." The only excluded testimony 
related to that tendered by the Mayor of 
North Salt Lake concerning experiences 
with Gibbons and Reed and its impact on 
that community. The Court excluded the 
testimony because it concluded the witness 
had no 'interest' because of a geographic 
remoteness to the area in question. How-
ever, all of the other testimony not re-
lating to 'municipal services' the Court 
has heard but at this time must rule that 
it is irrelevant and that the Court cannot 
give it credence in effecting its Decision 
as to whether the disconnection should be 
allowed. (R. 125). 
While it is true that the court allowed most of 
Appellant's witnesses to testify, it might just as well not 
I 
have heard them at all, since the Court proceeded to rule 
11 
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that nearly all of their testimony was "irrelevant" and 
that "the Court cannot give it credence." (R. 125). 
Why, then, hear the witnesses at all? 
The pertinent words of Section 10-2-501 (3), are 
that any interested parties "may appear before the court and 
contest the granting of the petition for disconnection by 
presenting the evidence as they deem relevant. " 
Certainly, the legislature must be deemed to have 
had a serious purpose in writing this section. It would have 
been frivolous in the extreme if it had intended to open the 
door to ever-1 interested party to come and say what he thinks 
is relevant, but then,. in effect, tell him, "but the court 
really isn't going to pay any attention to what you say." 
The language of the statute can not have been inadvertent. 
It constitutes such a departure from the procedure ordinarily 
utilized in the district courts of the state of Utah, that 
it simply has to have been written with the intention of 
greatly enlarging the areas which the Court can, and, indeed, 
must consider in disconnection cases. 
In other words, if the Court, as it acknowledged, 
(R. 125), is required to hear the testimony of such witnesses, 
it must also pay careful attention to the testimony, and give 
it equally serious consideration in arriving at its decision 
on the question of disconnection. An.y other interpretation of 
the statute is illogical. 
12 
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It will be argued by Respondents that the evidence 
that the Court can consider in making its decision is limited 
to the specific criteria recited in Sec. 10-2-503. This 
plainly is not so. 
The legislature in writing Sec. 10-2-503, obviously 
intended that the Court should take many other matters into 
consideration. If not, that statute never would have used 
the clear and obvious language "the Court shall consider among 
other factors ...... " 
The words , "among other factors 11 , are so unusual 
and significant in this context that it is.obvious that they 
were used, advisedly for the purpose of opening up a broad 
spectrum of matters that must be considered and weighed by 
the Court in arriving at a decision on disconnection. 
I 
The conclusion that the evidence deemed 11 irrelevant" 
in the Court's decision, should, indeed, be given equal weight 
to other testimony, becomes inescapable when Sections 10-2-501 
(3) and 10-2-503 are read together. 
The language of the two Sections, complimenting, 
and reinforcing each other as they do, and covering the same 
subject matter, could not have been written by chance. The 
provisions clearly have the same goal--to open up trials of 
disconnection cases to full and fair consideration of all 
matters in order that small groups of land owners, for what-
ever their reasons, not be allowed to flout the will of the 
13 
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rest of the residents, however many there be, and 
arbitrarily pull their property out of the city limits. 
In Respondents' reply memorandum (R. 85) they 
attempt to avail themselves of the rule of "ejusdem generis, 11 
in trying to restrict the meaning of "other factors" to the 
same kind of things thereafter set out in the statute, i.e., 
municipal services, and peninsular masses. 
In doing so, they completely disregard and, in fact, 
cripple, the clear meaning of the word 11 other. 11 "Other" in 
this context cannot be interpreted to mean "similar" or the 
"same." It must be construed as 11 additional 11 or "different. 11 
As stated in 67 C.J.S., pg. 908: 
While it is referred to as a word of addition, 
in its natural, usual, and normal use, it 
indicates some thing or things in addition 
to, differing from, or both additional to 
and differing from, the antecedant thing 
or things immediately in contemplation. 
It has been said that the word "other" or-
dinarily means different from, different, 
different in nature and kind, different 
from that which has been specified, different 
or distinct from the one or ones mentioned or 
implied, different person or thing from the 
one in view or under consideration just 
specified, not the same. 
It is important to note that the phrase used in the 
statute is "among other factors, 11 not "such other factors 
as." 
The rule of ejusdem generis is but one of construction 
and does not warrant a court in conforming the operation of a 
14 
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statute within narrower limits than intended by the legis-
lature. Willard vs. First security Bank of Idaho, Idaho, 
206 P. 2d 770 (1949). 
It should be noted that the general words "among other 
factors" appear before the list of particular matters relied on 
by Respondents. The court, in Lyman vs. Bowmar, Colo., 533P. 
2d 1129 (1975) said .that the ejusdern generis rule should be 
used to construe general words in a statute only when the 
general words follow, rather than precede, an enumeration of 
particular classes of persons or things. 
Certainly, Highland's government and its citizens, 
should not be limited in their defense against_ the efforts of 
Respondents merely because they were more imaginitive in pre-
senting their case, and that, in doing so, they raised many 
issues that had not been brought up in previously reported 
cases. 
Some of the points raised by Appellant were thought to 
be important by Justice Hansen in a dissenting opinion in 
·rn Re consolidated Mining Co., et al, 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044 
(1928), where he listed the following requirements for dis-
connection which are pertinent in this case, to wit: 
Does the property sought to be excluded 
from the city receive any direct and special 
benefit from the exercise of the powers 
granted to the city? Is it probable that 
the future growth and expansion of the 
city will require the territory sought 
to be disconnected? Is the property 
sought to be disconnected necessary for 
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the use of the city? 
71 Utah at 440, 266 P. at 1048. 
Certainly, Appellant's witnesses effectively raised 
the fact that the future growth and expansion of the city 
requires the territory in question to remain within the city 
limits, and the fact that it is necessary for the use of the 
city. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that the 
court erred in refusing to take into consideration and 
give "credence 11 to the evidence produced by Appell ant 's 
witnesses at the trial. 
POINT II 
.THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JUSTICE 
ANlJ EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE TERRITORY 
BE DISCONNECTED. 
Sec. 10-2-502 requires the Court, in a disconnection 
proceeding, to find, not only that the petition was signed 
by a majority of the registered voters of the territory 
concerned and that the allegations of the petition are true, 
but also that "justice and equity require the territory or any 
part thereof to be disconnected from the municipality ..•..... " 
For reasons set forth in Point I of Appellant's 
Argument, the Court is obligated to consider Appellant's 
evidence as strongly as it does Respondents' in deciding 
whether or not to disconnect the territory. 
Certainly, the petition of disaffected property 
owners should not be approved automatically, nor indeed, merely 
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on the basis of such limited evidence as has been adduced 
by Respondents. 
The evidence Respondents are required to give in 
a disconnection case must be stronger than they have provided 
here. To prevail, their evidence must also be stronger than 
that of Appellant. 
When Respondents' claim is measured against the 
standard of Sec. 10-2-502, "that justice and equity require" 
the territory to be disconnected, it is even more obvious 
that it is wanting. 
If 11 justice 11 is to be given its proper interpretation, 
the desire of the property owners to pull out of the city in 
order to facilitate the creation and operation of a new 
gravel and sand operation with all of its attendant evils 
cannot be allowed to prevail over the fervent wishes of so 
many residents of Highland City to maintain the quality of 
life for which they fled to Highland City from their former 
homes. The same reasoning, of course, applies to the word 
"equity• II 
The word 11 require 11 means much more than "allow" or 
11 permit. 11 It means "imperative need' 1 , Park vs Candler, 
Ga. 40 S.E. 523 (1902); or "compel", Hiestand vs. Ristou, 
Neb., 284 N.W. 756 (1939); or "mandatory", Mississippi River 
Fuel Corp. vs. Slayton, 339 F 2d 106 (8th Cir. 1966). 
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Certainly, 11 justice and equity" don 1 t 11 require" 
disconnection of the territory when there are such important 
and compelling "other factors" in evidence against it, as 
Appellant has pointed out in its Statement of Facts, and 
in Point I of its Argument. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING 
THAT DISCONNECTION WOULD NOT CREATE ISLANDS 
OR UNREASONABLY LARGE OR VARIED SHAPED 
PENINSULAR LAND MASSES PROJECTING INTO 
HIGHLAND CITY, AND FURTHER ERRED IN RE-
FUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO 
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER OF DISCONNECTION IN VIEW 
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
ANNEXATION OF THE KJAR PROPERTY. 
Sec. 10-2-503, in delineating certain criteria which 
the Court 11 shall "consider in deciding as to disconnection, 
in.eludes the question of "whether or not the disconnection 
will result in islands or unusually large or varied shaped 
peninsular masses within or projecting into the boundaries 
of the municipality from which the territory is to be dis-
connected. 11 
Appellant doesn't quarrel with the fact that, at the 
time of the evidentiary phase of the trial, disconnection of 
the territory in question, because of its location at the 
eastern edge of Highland City and its rather regular shape, 
would not have produced the condition referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. 
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However, after the presentation of the evidence was 
concluded, but before the Court ruled, Highland City completed 
the annexation of what_was referred to at the trial as the 
"Kjar property." It was shown on the plat introduced at the 
trial. All the Exhibits introduced at the trial were later 
misplaced and the Utah County Clerk was not able to locate 
and certify them. Consequently, the parties have stipulated 
to the substitution of a map which has been filed with the 
Court. 
Upon learning about the annexation, Appellant's 
attorney wrote a letter dated September 16, 1981, so advising 
the Court. (R. 144). The Court completely disregarded the 
annexation and proceeded to make its Findings, Conclusions, 
and Order of Disconnection, as though it simply had not 
occurred. Thereupon, Appellant moved for a new trial, or at 
least a modification by the Court, but this was denied. 
The facts created by the annexation clearly contra-
dict Finding number 7, and Conclusion number l, to the effect 
that no island or unreasonably large or varied-shaped penin-
sular land mass would be created by the disconnection. 
The annexation would, in fact, create a virtual island 
out of the disconnected territory inasmuch as the Kjar property 
lies to the east and is entirely separated from and outside 
the rest of the city. At the very least, the Kjar annexation, 
coupled with the proposed disconnection, would create an 
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unusually large peninsular land mass (the disconnected 
property, itself) projecting into the city. 
While Joseph A. Kjar did testify at the trial of 
having talked with Mayor LeBaron about the possibility of 
the annexation of his property (T. 188, 189) this was not an 
accomplished fact at the time. Thus, Appellant was in no 
position to introduce evidence during the trial relating 
to the effect that annexation might have had. 
When the city did annex the Kjar property, this 
created new, compelling evidence not previously available. 
The Utah Court, in a criminal case, State vs. 
Weaver 78 Utah 555, 6 P. 2d 167 (1931), considered a 
motion for a new trial based on Sec. 77-38-3 (7), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended, which is almost identical in 
substance to Rule 59 (2) (4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court said, at 6 P. 2d 169: 
the Courts are not in accord respecting all 
these requirements, but fakly agree that 
the newly discovered evidence be such as 
could not with reasonable diligence have 
been discovered and produced at the trial, 
that it not be merely cumulative, and that 
it be such as to render a different result 
probable on the retrial of the case. 
Certainly the evidence created by the annexation of 
the Kjar property met the above criteria in every respect, 
and should have been taken into account by the court. 
20 
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The Judge, at the time the annexation was called to 
his attention, had not written Findings, Conclusions, or his 
Order of Disconnection. It was appropriate and proper therefore 
that he should direct that further evidence of the foregoing 
situation be presented by Appellant and Respondents along with 
any legal arguments they may have had as to its effect in 
light of Sec. 10-2-503. 
The district courts are given wide discretion in Utah 
as to whether or not to grant new trials on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. See Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 
247 P. 2d 264 (1952) where a new trial was granted. 
Notwithstanding that latitude, however, it appears 
that the court in this instance abused its discretion by pay-
ing absolutely no attention to the fact of the annexation 
of the Kjar property, and that it, coupled with the disconnect-
ion of the 131 acres, clearly created a large peninsular land 
mass extending into Highland City. 
At the very least, the court should have granted 
Appellant's motion for a new trial or at least amended the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusionsof Law,and Order of Disconnection 
to reflect the situation created by the Kjar annexation. 
Authority for such an action by the Court is con-
tained in Rule 59 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
authorizes the Court to "open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment. 11 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 
consider all of the evidence presented by Appellant and 
Intervenors, both during the trial and in connection with 
Appellant's motion for a new trial in determining-whether 
or not to allow disconnection of the territory, and to take 
whatever further evidence may be necessary or helpful in 
arriving at its decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Highland Town, aka 
Highland City, a Municipal 
Corporation 
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